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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Carlos Adrian Cruz-Romero appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony 
driving under the influence.  In his appellant’s brief, he argued that the district court 
erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that the Intoxilyzer 
used to test his breath-alcohol content was not working properly.  In response, the State 
asks this Court to affirm a ruling that intruded on the province of the jury and deprived 
Mr. Cruz-Romero of his constitutional right to defend against the State’s charges.  This 
reply addresses a handful of shortcomings in the State’s arguments.   
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ISSUES 
I. Did the district court err by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning? 
 
II. Did the district court violate Mr. Cruz-Romero’s constitutional right to present a 
complete defense by excluding evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning?   
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion In Limine To 
Exclude Evidence Of The Intoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
 
 Mr. Cruz-Romero argued in his appellant’s brief that the district court abused its 
discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude the operations log from 
his trial, absent expert testimony on the subject.1  The district court first found that the 
Intoxilyzer was working properly on the day in question, an issue that should have been 
left to the jury.  From that conclusion, the court erroneously found that evidence 
showing that the Intoxilyzer was out of tolerance before April 8 and after May 9 was not 
relevant and would be excluded from trial.  Finally, the court held that Mr. Cruz-Romero 
may be able to introduce that evidence to challenge Ms. Cutler’s, but not Deputy 
Sedlmayr’s, testimony.   
In response, the State first contends that the court’s “‘factual finding’ was neither 
erroneous nor binding on a non-existent jury.”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State has missed 
the point.  Mr. Cruz-Romero’s contention (which can hardly be disputed) is that the 
court’s finding prevented him from introducing the operations log to call into question the 
                                            
1 Mr. Cruz-Romero does not dispute that the court held he could call his own expert 
and, if he called that expert, he could then introduce evidence of the malfunctioning as 
represented in the logs.  But that fact does nothing to salvage the court’s decision.  
Mr. Cruz-Romero could properly call into question the reliability of the Intoxilyzer by 
using the operations log to cross examine whichever of the State’s witnesses introduced 
his breath test results, regardless of whether he called an expert. See State v. Ward, 
135 Idaho 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[O]nce the trial court has made the threshold 
determination of admissibility [of the test result], a defendant is free to attack the 
reliability and accuracy of the admitted evidence through the presentation of evidence at 
trial.  This evidence could include concessions elicited on cross-examination of the 
officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense expert.”) (internal citation 
omitted and emphasis added). 
 4 
reliability of the Intoxilyzer, unless he called an expert.  (App. Br., pp.8–13.)  By finding 
“that between the certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification on May 
9th that it does appear, at least from the logs, that the machine was working properly at 
that time” (Tr., p.35, Ls.13–17), the court decided that evidence of the Intoxilyzer 
malfunctioning was not relevant, and in turn excluded the operations log from trial.  But 
the reliability of the Intoxilyzer was an issue for the jury to decide at trial, not an issue for 
the court to decide during a motion in limine.      
In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879 (Ct. App. 2012)—the principle case on which 
Mr. Cruz-Romero relied and which the State wholly failed to mention in its response 
brief—gets at the crux of this issue.  At an administrative license suspension hearing, 
Hubbard sought to introduce evidence of fluctuating performance verification tests done 
before and after her breath test.  Id. at 882–83.  The district court excluded that 
evidence, concluding that the acceptable performance verification result on the day of 
Hubbard’s breath test established, as a matter of law, that the machine was working 
correctly.  Id. at 883.  The Court of Appeals rejected that logic:  “‘If there is evidence that 
any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to 
produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant to both the admissibility 
and weight of the test results.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 375 
(Ct. App. 1987) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Howell, 
122 Idaho 209, 212–13 (Ct. App. 1992)).  But because the burden in that case was on 
Hubbard, and there was no testimony about the possible causes or significance of the 
apparent malfunctioning, the Court of Appeals held that Hubbard did not meet her 
burden of showing that the testing equipment had malfunctioned.  Id. at 883–84.   
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Here, however, the burden is on the State to prove that the Intoxilyzer worked 
properly.  State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[t]he burden of 
persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the prosecution,” and 
thus “‘the reliability and performance of any given machine is subject to challenge.’”) 
(quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375).  Just as the Court of Appeals in Hubbard rejected 
the notion that an acceptable performance verification reading on the day of Hubbard’s 
breath test established that the machine worked properly as a matter of law, the district 
court here erred by concluding that the Intoxilyzer was working properly and thus 
excluding that evidence from trial.    
Relatedly, the State’s claim that Mr. Cruz-Romero “did not identify any evidence 
that he could present to demonstrate that his specific test results were unreliable or that 
the Intoxilyzer malfunctioned at the time of testing” relies on the same misunderstanding 
as above.  (Resp. Br., p.11.)  As an initial matter, the State again overlooks the burden 
of proof.  At the motion in limine hearing, it was the State’s burden of showing that the 
evidence was not relevant and thus should be excluded from trial.  See State v. Haynes, 
159 Idaho 36, 355 P.3d 1266, 1273 (2015).  Further, Mr. Cruz-Romero sought to 
introduce evidence of malfunctioning that was greater than that approved of in Hubbard: 
the operations log showed that the Intoxilyzer used to test Mr. Cruz-Romero’s breath on 
April 27 tested out of tolerance on April 5, May 15, and May 16 (Tr., p.19, Ls.11–19, 
p.21, Ls.8–25; Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 4); the Intoxilyzer did not calibrate properly on August 5, 
apparently because of a problem with a solution jar that was used as early as March 
2014 (Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.12, L.7; Def. Ex. A, p.7); Deputy Sedlmayr could not say 
whether the malfunctions in April and May were related to that jar (Tr., p.23, Ls.4–10); 
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and Deputy Sedlmayr could only infer that the Intoxilyzer was working properly on the 
day in question (Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.13, L.3, p.24, L.16 – p.25, L.13).  See Hubbard, 
152 Idaho at 882–83.  The State’s assertion that Mr. Cruz-Romero did not identify any 
evidence of the Intoxilyzer malfunctioning is baseless. 
The State correctly notes that Deputy Sedlmayr testified that the Intoxilyzer 
would not allow testing to proceed if it was out of tolerance (Resp. Br., p.11), but 
overlooks that he also said he did not know whether the Intoxilyzer could malfunction 
but not give an out of tolerance reading:  
Q:  What—can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn’t 
show up that it’s out of tolerance but there are still issues with the 
instrument? 
A:  Not that I’m aware of.  There’s a lot of different checks and 
balances for—and information along those lines.  I would have to refer you 
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab. 
Q:  So you don’t have the knowledge to answer that?  
A:  No.  
 
(Tr., p.22, L.18 – p.23, L.3.)  Therefore, even if it were proper for the court to make a 
factual finding about whether the Intoxilyzer worked properly in order to determine 
whether the evidence was relevant, the State did not meet its burden of proving as 
much.   
Finally, the State takes issue with Mr. Cruz-Romero’s interpretation of the district 
court’s ruling regarding his ability to cross-examine Deputy Sedlmayr.  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  
The relevant exchange is as follows:  
Ms. Scott [the State]:  Your Honor, the State had gotten the expert 
essentially as rebuttal evidence to show that it was working properly at the 
date and time in question.  It was a preliminary procedure that we took in 
order to have somebody here so that they could testify that, in fact, on that 
day, the instrument was working properly.    
However, there’s been no expert shown or disclosed to state that it 
wasn’t, and that’s the issue here is that there's been no presentation given 
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or anybody disclosed that would show that that instrument was not 
working properly on the date and time.    
The Court:  Ms. DePew, is it correct that the defense does not have 
an expert in this case?    
Ms. DePew [defense counsel]:  We do not, Your Honor, but what 
the State’s asking us to do is be precluded from cross examining their 
expert as to their conclusions.  If the expert’s allowed to testify based on 
whatever information they have that this machine was working properly, 
the defense has a right to question what they base that decision on.   
The Court:  I agree.  If the State calls Ms. Cutler, then you certainly 
have a right to examine her as to those issues, but what is the relevance 
of this evidence if they do not call Ms. Cutler in their case in chief?    
Ms. DePew:  Your Honor, I still believe it’s relevant through Officer 
Sedlmayr.  He’s considered an expert on the breath testing machine.  He’s 
going to testify that it was working properly.  I, again, have a right to cross 
examine that opinion.  
The Court:  All right.  The Court is going to—as far as the evidence 
of the malfunctioning of the Intox 5000, the evidence before the Court, at 
this time, demonstrates that between the certification of the machine on 
April 8th and the recertification on May 9th that it does appear, at least 
from the logs, that the machine was working properly at that time.  There 
is no indication about a tolerance.    
Presumptively, the State’s evidence will demonstrate the 
certification for the Intoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results.  Absent 
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of 
indications that the Intox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th 
of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value.  And certainly if 
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change 
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results 
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be 
admissible at trial. . . .    
 
(Tr., p.34, L.3 – p.36, L.6 (emphasis added).)   
 The State is correct that the court did not explicitly say that Mr. Cruz-Romero 
could not cross examine Deputy Sedlmayr using the operations logs.  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  
What the court did say is that “[a]bsent expert testimony on the subject, [the operations 
log] is not of probative value,” and “certainly if the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler,” 
then maybe the operations logs could come in.  (Tr., p.35, L.21 – p.36, L.3.)  The court 
gave no indication that the evidence would be admitted under any other circumstance.  
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 More importantly, the common thread throughout the above dialogue is that both 
the State and the court believed that Mr. Cruz-Romero had the burden at trial of proving 
the Intoxilyzer malfunctioned.  The State said it listed Ms. Cutler to present “rebuttal 
evidence to show that it was working properly at the date and time in question,” and, 
according to the court, “[p]resumptively, the State’s evidence will demonstrate the 
certification for the Intoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results.”  (Tr., p.34, L.4–6, p.35, 
Ls.19–21 (emphasis added).)  To the contrary, the State still had the burden to prove 
the Intoxilyzer results were reliable.  See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (“The burden of 
persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the prosecution.”). 
Whoever intended to testify as much at trial—whether Ms. Cutler, Deputy Sedlmayr, or 
Sergeant West—was subject to cross examination about the reliability of those test 
results, and the operation log was a proper way to call those results into question.  
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (the defense can challenge breath results by presenting 
evidence such as “concessions elicited on cross-examination of the officer who 
administered the test”).  The district court’s ruling to the contrary was an abuse of 
discretion.  
     
II. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero’s Constitutional Right To Present A 
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The Intoxilyzer Malfunctioning 
 
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Cruz-Romero argued that the district court’s ruling on 
the motion in limine deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete 
defense, which includes the right to introduce evidence and cross examine witnesses 
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regarding the Intoxilyzer’s performance in order to challenge the validity of his breath 
test results.  (App. Br., pp.8–14.)   
In response, the State contends that Mr. Cruz-Romero did not preserve this issue 
for appeal because an objection must state “the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context,” I.R.E. 103(a)(1), and he “never 
objected to the state’s motion on constitutional grounds” (Resp. Br., p.12).  The State 
correctly notes that defense counsel did not specifically state that the court’s ruling 
implicated Mr. Cruz-Romero’s constitutional rights, but the State’s claim that he needed 
to do so to preserve the issue is baseless.   
As an initial matter, the State has overlooked that I.R.E. 103(a)(1) applies only to 
objections made to rulings admitting evidence, not excluding it.  Regardless, the 
grounds for Mr. Cruz-Romero’s objection were clear.  He told the district court that he 
had a right to introduce the operations log because “[i]t is up to the jury to decide 
whether or not this instrument and the reading that it gave us is something that they 
believe establishes the BAC beyond a doubt” (Tr., p.31, Ls.10–14), and that the court’s 
ruling “precluded [him] from cross examining their expert as to their conclusions” 
(Tr., p.34, Ls.19–21).  Therefore, the purpose behind requiring a specific objection—“to 
alert the trial court and the other party to the grounds of the objection so that it may be 
addressed or cured”—was met.  See State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 251 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885 (Ct. App. 2005)).  Mr. Cruz-
Romero need not also cite the source of those grounds.  See State v. Almaraz, 
154 Idaho 584, 602 (2013) (“Although the rule was not specifically invoked, the 
defense’s arguments surrounding Lieutenant Steele’s testimony show that the defense 
 10 
was concerned that her conclusion was a lay opinion that was not helpful to a clear 
understanding for the jury and was based on specialized knowledge as a police officer 
in violation of I.R.E. 701.”).  The State’s claim that Mr. Cruz-Romero failed to preserve 
this issue because he did not specifically cite the U.S. or Idaho Constitutions is without 
merit. 
   
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cruz-Romero respectfully asks this Court to vacate his judgment of 
conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State’s motion in limine, and 
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 24th day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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